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Jimmy Carter was President of the United States, 
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and was running for re-election on the Democratic ticket 
in the 1980 Presidential election. Four years earlier, 
carter had captured an overwhelming majority in Tennessee 
and defeated Republican President Gerald R. Ford by 
200,000 votes. In 1976 the fourth congressional district 
in Tennessee gave Carter the largest majority of any 
congressional district in the country. 
Yet, on November 4, 1980, Jimmy Carter was defeated 
in his try for Tennessee's 10 electoral votes and in his 
bid for a second term in the White House, by Republican 
nominee Ronald Reagan. 
President Carter was defeated by only 5,576 votes; 
however, such an overwhelming victory in 1976 should not 
have turned into defeat in 1980, especially in a state 
which the Democratic National Committee had targeted to win, 
no matter how small the margin. 
At first glance, there appears to have been a complete 
and total breakdown of the Democratic Machine, which for so 
many years had controlled Tennessee State Politics. This 
however, could not have been the case. For even with a 
Republican Governor and a well financed and concentrated 
effort to wrench control of the state legislature from the 
Democratic Party, the Republicans were able to gain only 
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one seat in the State House of Representatives and none 
in the State Senate. Clearly the old party machine was 
still intact. 
What then were the factors which led to Jimmy 
Carter's defeat in Tennessee in the 1980 ~esidential 
-election? 
This paper will attempt to provid~ an analysis of 
these factors. In order to explore these liabilities, 
however, the author will first discuss the strategy which 
the Carter campaign emplqyed in Tennessee. It must be 
understood that the author of this paper was actively in-
volved in the Carter campaign and, therefore, was not 
unbiased. This paper was written from a campaign worker's 
point of view, and every attempt will be made here to 
discuss matters which deal with that campaign in Tennessee. 
Campaigning Strategy 
The Carter campaign used the same strategy which 
Tennessee Democrats had beenusirig . in state elections for 
1 years. This was, in effect, a four step process: 
1} An attempt was made to cut losses in upper 
East Tennessee, in what is now the first 
and second congressional districts, and 
traditionally Republican area. 
In order to achieve this, the Democratic 
campaign forces assigned a chairman to both 
districts and tried to build a county level 
organization in each county in the districts. 
Also, President Carter made one campaign 
stop in the area. 
2) A concentrated effort was made to build a 
large lead in Middle Tennessee, especially 
in the fourth congressional district with 
its large percentage of Democratic voters, 
and in Hamilton and Davidson counties with 
their large black populations. 
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This area was the key to the whole campaign, 
which started very early in Middle Tennessee. 
Even before the nomination was secure, Rosalyn 
Carter had made a campaign stop in Murfreesboro, 
the largest city in the fourth Congressional 
district. 
During the general election campaign, Middle 
Tennessee was bombarded by political celebri-
ties: Chip Carter made a stop in Nashville 
to open the campaign headquarters: Jim Sasser 
and Ned Ray McWherter took a two day bus tour 
of the fourth Congressional district to promote 
the President, Joan Mondale spent one day 
campaigning in the area, and the President 
himself came to Nashville for one of his famous 
town "meetings." 
3) The Democrats tried to cut their losses in rural 
West Tennessee where pockets of Republican voters 
could cut into the Middle Tennessee lead, especi-
ally in Madison and east Shelby counties, and win 
by a large margin in downtown Memphis. 
In order to accomplish this, traditional Democratic 
voters were called upon. Counties with histories 
of large Democratic turnouts were targeted for 
extra effort. Blacks in Memphis were relied on 
heavily. 
4) A huge voter registration drive was conducted, 
since a large voter turnout generally helps 
a Democratic candidate~ 
This was potentially dangerous. There was the 
possibility that by registering liberal voters, 
who would traditionally vote for the Democratic 
candidate, the drive would actually register 
Anderson votes. 
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Campaign Liabilities 
There was a vital flaw in this strategy, even though 
it had worked well in the past in gubernatorial and other 
state elections. When, however, employed in Presidential 
elections in Tennessee, the Democrats have met with more 
than a little disappointment. Tennessee has given its 
electoral votes to only two Democrats in the last seven 
elections. 
This is possibly due to the different make-up of a 
Presidential campaign. In a state election, the candidate 
is always available--he will be at every "watermelon cutting 
in every country in the state. Throughout the election, the 
statewide candidate is a familiar person, or can become 
one. 
In a Presidential election, the candidate is more or 
less insulated from the voters. Because of the massive 
territory in which he must campaign, he cannot become as 
familiar a person as the statewide candidate can. 
Of course this was as true for the _Reagan campaign 
as the Carter campaign, but with official duties of the 
Presidency and pressures of the office upon him, President 
Carter may have seemed more distant than Reagan. 
A second liability of the Carter campaign in Tennessee 
was the makeup of the Tennessee staff. With the exception 
of Jim Hall, Carter's campaign coordinator, the campaign 
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was made up of people from out-of-state. The campaign 
manager and deputy campaign mamager were both brought 
into Tennessee, just to run the campaign. 
This caused some resentment among Democrats who, in 
the past, had taken a large part in running the campaign. 
The managers were not familiar with the people of 
Tennessee and, according to some campaign volunteers, 
did not seem to care about the people. Some felt that 
the managers may have been great in Washington, but were 
lousy as Tennessee campaign managers. 
In the words of one worker, "they don't know anything 
about the people in Tracy City--how can they make a decision 
to influence their votes?" Another said, "they just don't 
care about the people around here--they just want to play 
hardball with the boys from Washington." 
Probably the greatest single liability of the Carter 
campaign was the disappointment which the people of the 
United States and Tennessee felt with the dismal record 
of the Carter administration. Tennessee had given their 
full trust to Jimmy Carter in 1976 and the majority of 
voters seemed to feel that he had let them down. 
Summing It Up: Why Carter Lost 
According to a poll taken by the N~~ York Times and 
CBS News on election day, the overwhelming reason that 
voters gave their vote to Reaganwas the need for change. 
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David Fox, press secretary for the Cart~r campaign 
Tennessee, stated that "it was the economy, the hostages, 
the debate, everything. You could tell from the 
looked at Reagan (in the debate) that he did not like him 
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and that did not go over very well." 
Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee asid, "I think the 
events of the last week of the campaign played a part in 
shifting votes to Reagan." 3 
Bill Brock, GOP national chairman, agreed that the 
electorate was voting for a change. Brock said, "I think 
that the voters have decided that we need a lot of new 
faces in politics." 4 
Perhaps the reason for the Carter loss was best 
summed up by a Bill Boner staff member on election night: 
"We made a mistake by assuming that Tennessee is different 
than the rest of the country, and really the people here 
are affected by the same things which effect the people 
all over the country." 
And that was the case. The dissatisfaction which 
was felt by the country with the Carter administration, 
according to most polls, was also felt in Tennessee. 
Because it was, the Republicans were able to capitalize 
the dissatisfaction to win a narrow victory over Jimmy 
Carter in Tennessee, a state which gave him overwhelming 
support only four years earlier. 
NOTES 
Mike Williams is a major in Econom~cs at 
Middle Tennessee State University. 
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1From conversations with Congressional District 
coordinators. The Republican strategy was exactly 
opposite--beat Carter in East Tennes~ee, hold the line 
in Middle and win a narrow victory in West Tennessee, 
according to the Nashville· Tenne·s ·sean in its post-
election coverage. 
2From the Nashville Tennessean, November 5, 1980. 
3From the Nashville Tennessean, November 5, 1980. 
Sasser was talking about not only the renewed talk of 
the Iranian hostage crisis, but in Tennessee, former 
Democratic Governor Ray Blanton was indicted. This 
could have brought out some "anti-Democratic" votes. 
4 From the Nashville Tennessean, November 5, 1980. 
